Fraud Risk Check · October 2026

Pexley Building Supplies Ltd

Builders' merchant with two branches in Staffordshire and Cheshire: timber, heavy-side materials, landscaping and plumbing to trade and retail customers. 55 staff.

Worked example. Pexley Building Supplies is fictional; every name and figure is invented. All figures come from the worked-example spreadsheet: ALL CHECKS PASSED. This is a check of controls, not an audit or an investigation.
The headline

Three High risks, and none of the fixes costs money

High risks
3
of 12 frauds that could happen here; 6 more Medium
At stake
£60,000
the largest single loss before anyone would notice, on a High risk: 14% of a year's profit
Controls
8 of 25
fully in place; 7 partly, 10 missing
Gaps on High risks
6
to close, 4 of them due within 30 days, each with an owner

Verdict: 3 High-risk frauds, led by email or bank login taken over: 6 gaps to close, 4 of them due within 30 days. None of the High risks needs money spent: a call-back rule, a second approver, two-step login and a written "no payment on an email alone" rule close most of the gap. The biggest exposures are from outside: fraudsters impersonating suppliers and the owner, and stolen logins.

Where the risk is

Every fraud that could happen here, ranked

Email or bank login taken overHigh · outsider
20likelihood 5 × impact 4 · up to £60,000 before noticed · controls 25% in place
Bank details changed on a supplierHigh · outsider
16likelihood 4 × impact 4 · up to £48,000 before noticed · controls 50% in place
Fake instruction from the bossHigh · outsider
15likelihood 5 × impact 3 · up to £35,000 before noticed · controls 0% in place
Hiding it in the booksMedium · insider
12likelihood 3 × impact 4 · up to £50,000 before noticed · controls 50% in place
Goods taken on credit by a fake customerMedium · outsider
9likelihood 3 × impact 3 · up to £22,000 before noticed · controls 75% in place
A supplier set up by someone insideMedium · insider
9likelihood 3 × impact 3 · up to £30,000 before noticed · controls 0% in place
Cash and stock going missingMedium · insider
9likelihood 3 × impact 3 · up to £40,000 before noticed · controls 75% in place
Kickbacks from suppliersMedium · insider
9likelihood 3 × impact 3 · up to £25,000 before noticed · controls 25% in place
Refunds and credit notesMedium · insider
8likelihood 4 × impact 2 · up to £9,000 before noticed · controls 0% in place
Fake or duplicate invoicesLow · outsider
6likelihood 3 × impact 2 · up to £12,000 before noticed · controls 75% in place
Expenses and company cardsLow · insider
6likelihood 3 × impact 2 · up to £6,000 before noticed · controls 75% in place
Payroll fraudLow · insider
2likelihood 1 × impact 2 · up to £15,000 before noticed · controls 100% in place

Risk = likelihood × impact, each 1 to 5. Likelihood starts from how common the fraud is in small firms and moves with the controls in place; impact is the largest loss before you'd notice, against a year's profit of £420,000. High is 15 or more.

The plan

17 gaps to close, High risks first

ByControl to put in placeOwner
23 Oct 2026Written rule: no payment on an email or call alone, whoever it appears to come from high risk
Fake instruction from the boss · now: no. Nothing written; the MD often asks for payments by text
Managing director
30 Oct 2026Bank detail changes are confirmed by phone on a number already held, never one in the email high risk
Bank details changed on a supplier · now: no. Accounts assistant changes details on email instruction
Finance manager
30 Oct 2026A second person approves every payment run and every new or changed payee high risk
Bank details changed on a supplier · now: partly. Finance manager approves runs, but new payees go straight in
Finance manager
30 Oct 2026Two-step login on email, banking and the accounts system high risk
Email or bank login taken over · now: partly. On banking; not on email or the accounts system
IT support company
20 Nov 2026Staff who make payments have been shown what these requests look like in the last year high risk
Fake instruction from the boss · now: no. Never done
Finance manager
27 Nov 2026Staff trained to spot phishing in the last year high risk
Email or bank login taken over · now: no. Never done
IT support company
30 Oct 2026The bank is reconciled every month by someone who doesn't make payments
Hiding it in the books · now: no. Finance manager pays and reconciles
Managing director
13 Nov 2026New trade accounts are credit-checked and the contact details verified independently
Goods taken on credit by a fake customer · now: partly. Credit-checked, but details taken from the application form
Credit controller
13 Nov 2026The person who sets up suppliers is not the person who pays them
A supplier set up by someone inside · now: no. Accounts assistant does both
Finance manager
13 Nov 2026Company card statements are reviewed and signed off every month
Expenses and company cards · now: partly. Reviewed, but the MD's own card is not reviewed by anyone
Finance manager
27 Nov 2026Credit notes and refunds over a limit are approved by a manager
Refunds and credit notes · now: no. Counter staff can raise credit notes of any size
Operations director
27 Nov 2026A report of credit notes by person is reviewed every month
Refunds and credit notes · now: no. No report
Finance manager
18 Dec 2026Supplier invoices are matched to an order and a delivery before payment
Fake or duplicate invoices · now: partly. Matched for stock purchases; overheads paid on sight
Finance manager
18 Dec 2026The supplier list is reviewed at least once a year for ones nobody recognises
A supplier set up by someone inside · now: no. Never reviewed
Finance manager
18 Dec 2026Quotations are required for purchases over a set amount
Kickbacks from suppliers · now: partly. Expected but not written down
Operations director
18 Dec 2026Buyers declare any personal link to a supplier
Kickbacks from suppliers · now: no. Never asked
Managing director
29 Jan 2027Stock is counted regularly by someone independent of the branch
Cash and stock going missing · now: partly. Yearly count only, by branch staff
Operations director
If you suspect a fraud is happening: don't confront anyone or let them know. Keep the evidence, call your bank straight away if money has gone, report it to Action Fraud (Police Scotland in Scotland), and get specialist advice before acting.
How confident are we?

What this rests on

Whether each fraud could happen here, the money involved, the largest loss before you would notice and whether each control is in place are your own answers; evidence is recorded for every control said to be in place. How common each fraud is in small firms starts as our judgement, not a statistic. Scores rank the risks to act on first; they are not a probability or a forecast of losses. Frauds overlap (a stolen login is often how a fake bank-detail change arrives), so losses are not added together. This is a check of controls, not an audit or an investigation: if you suspect a fraud is happening, don't confront anyone or alert them; get specialist advice and keep the evidence.

The months after

What the agent flagged, and what was decided

At handover, the managing director signed the written rule that no payment is made on an email or call alone. The agent was then set up in Pexley's own AI assistant account, with read-only access to the accounts system's audit trail, the purchase and sales ledgers and the bank's proposed payments. Every weekday at 7:00, before payments are approved, it looks for the warning signs each control is meant to catch, and sends any flag to the managing director, who makes no payments. It uses the limits on Inputs: payments over £1,000 to a payee added or changed in the last 90 days, credit notes over £500, and payments outside the run over £2,500. Nothing left Pexley, and no decision changed, without one of its own people approving it. These events continue the fictional example.

Weekday runs
31
19 October to 30 November
Flags raised
5
each decided by a named person and logged
Bank-detail change
2 days
flagged two days before the payment run it would have been paid in
High risks after the fixes
1
down from 3, once the owners updated Controls with evidence
DateWhat the agent foundFlag?What people decided
21 OctA supplier's bank details had been changed the afternoon before, after an emailed letter, with £18,640 due to the new account in Friday's run.FlagThe finance manager phoned the supplier on the number already held: no change had been asked for. The details were put back, the email reported, and the payment went to the usual account.
30 OctThe fix-by date for two-step login on email and the accounts system passed with the control still only partly in place.FlagEmail was covered on 2 November; the accounts system was booked for 9 November and the date moved on Controls.
3 NovA £1,280 credit note was raised at a branch counter with no manager's approval, above the £500 limit.FlagA genuine return of damaged paving slabs, approved afterwards. A £500 limit was set on the tills.
10 NovTwo invoices for the same delivery from a fixings supplier, both in the next payment run.FlagThe second invoice was held and a credit note requested.
16 NovThe same login set up a new supplier and added it to the payment run, the job split the plan had due by 13 November.FlagThe supplier was genuine. Supplier set-up moved to the credit controller, and Controls updated with that evidence.
30 NovMonthly summary: five flags, each decided. After the owners updated Controls, High-risk frauds fell from 3 to 1 and the gaps on them from 6 to 1: staff training on phishing is still to do.Note onlyPhishing training booked for January, with the yearly briefing for everyone who makes payments.

At the 30-day check-in on 18 November, Geoff and the managing director read the log together. They kept the limits on Inputs, and agreed the monthly summary should also go to the finance manager.

What the agent added. The method is unchanged: same spreadsheet, same controls, same scores. The agent looked for the warning signs every weekday, so the bank-detail change reached someone independent of the payment two days before the run, and the plan's fix-by dates were followed up as they passed. The flags describe transactions and controls; none of them suggested anyone was committing fraud. The figures above are fictional, and no £ figure is claimed for the agent.

Fictional and labelled: these events continue the worked example. The same six events are the sample rows in the Agent log of the worked-example spreadsheet. The agent is part of the guided and done-for-you routes; the self-implement kit does not include it.