Builders' merchant with two branches in Staffordshire and Cheshire: timber, heavy-side materials, landscaping and plumbing to trade and retail customers. 55 staff.
Verdict: 3 High-risk frauds, led by email or bank login taken over: 6 gaps to close, 4 of them due within 30 days. None of the High risks needs money spent: a call-back rule, a second approver, two-step login and a written "no payment on an email alone" rule close most of the gap. The biggest exposures are from outside: fraudsters impersonating suppliers and the owner, and stolen logins.
Risk = likelihood × impact, each 1 to 5. Likelihood starts from how common the fraud is in small firms and moves with the controls in place; impact is the largest loss before you'd notice, against a year's profit of £420,000. High is 15 or more.
| By | Control to put in place | Owner |
|---|---|---|
| 23 Oct 2026 | Written rule: no payment on an email or call alone, whoever it appears to come from high risk Fake instruction from the boss · now: no. Nothing written; the MD often asks for payments by text | Managing director |
| 30 Oct 2026 | Bank detail changes are confirmed by phone on a number already held, never one in the email high risk Bank details changed on a supplier · now: no. Accounts assistant changes details on email instruction | Finance manager |
| 30 Oct 2026 | A second person approves every payment run and every new or changed payee high risk Bank details changed on a supplier · now: partly. Finance manager approves runs, but new payees go straight in | Finance manager |
| 30 Oct 2026 | Two-step login on email, banking and the accounts system high risk Email or bank login taken over · now: partly. On banking; not on email or the accounts system | IT support company |
| 20 Nov 2026 | Staff who make payments have been shown what these requests look like in the last year high risk Fake instruction from the boss · now: no. Never done | Finance manager |
| 27 Nov 2026 | Staff trained to spot phishing in the last year high risk Email or bank login taken over · now: no. Never done | IT support company |
| 30 Oct 2026 | The bank is reconciled every month by someone who doesn't make payments Hiding it in the books · now: no. Finance manager pays and reconciles | Managing director |
| 13 Nov 2026 | New trade accounts are credit-checked and the contact details verified independently Goods taken on credit by a fake customer · now: partly. Credit-checked, but details taken from the application form | Credit controller |
| 13 Nov 2026 | The person who sets up suppliers is not the person who pays them A supplier set up by someone inside · now: no. Accounts assistant does both | Finance manager |
| 13 Nov 2026 | Company card statements are reviewed and signed off every month Expenses and company cards · now: partly. Reviewed, but the MD's own card is not reviewed by anyone | Finance manager |
| 27 Nov 2026 | Credit notes and refunds over a limit are approved by a manager Refunds and credit notes · now: no. Counter staff can raise credit notes of any size | Operations director |
| 27 Nov 2026 | A report of credit notes by person is reviewed every month Refunds and credit notes · now: no. No report | Finance manager |
| 18 Dec 2026 | Supplier invoices are matched to an order and a delivery before payment Fake or duplicate invoices · now: partly. Matched for stock purchases; overheads paid on sight | Finance manager |
| 18 Dec 2026 | The supplier list is reviewed at least once a year for ones nobody recognises A supplier set up by someone inside · now: no. Never reviewed | Finance manager |
| 18 Dec 2026 | Quotations are required for purchases over a set amount Kickbacks from suppliers · now: partly. Expected but not written down | Operations director |
| 18 Dec 2026 | Buyers declare any personal link to a supplier Kickbacks from suppliers · now: no. Never asked | Managing director |
| 29 Jan 2027 | Stock is counted regularly by someone independent of the branch Cash and stock going missing · now: partly. Yearly count only, by branch staff | Operations director |
Whether each fraud could happen here, the money involved, the largest loss before you would notice and whether each control is in place are your own answers; evidence is recorded for every control said to be in place. How common each fraud is in small firms starts as our judgement, not a statistic. Scores rank the risks to act on first; they are not a probability or a forecast of losses. Frauds overlap (a stolen login is often how a fake bank-detail change arrives), so losses are not added together. This is a check of controls, not an audit or an investigation: if you suspect a fraud is happening, don't confront anyone or alert them; get specialist advice and keep the evidence.
At handover, the managing director signed the written rule that no payment is made on an email or call alone. The agent was then set up in Pexley's own AI assistant account, with read-only access to the accounts system's audit trail, the purchase and sales ledgers and the bank's proposed payments. Every weekday at 7:00, before payments are approved, it looks for the warning signs each control is meant to catch, and sends any flag to the managing director, who makes no payments. It uses the limits on Inputs: payments over £1,000 to a payee added or changed in the last 90 days, credit notes over £500, and payments outside the run over £2,500. Nothing left Pexley, and no decision changed, without one of its own people approving it. These events continue the fictional example.
| Date | What the agent found | Flag? | What people decided |
|---|---|---|---|
| 21 Oct | A supplier's bank details had been changed the afternoon before, after an emailed letter, with £18,640 due to the new account in Friday's run. | Flag | The finance manager phoned the supplier on the number already held: no change had been asked for. The details were put back, the email reported, and the payment went to the usual account. |
| 30 Oct | The fix-by date for two-step login on email and the accounts system passed with the control still only partly in place. | Flag | Email was covered on 2 November; the accounts system was booked for 9 November and the date moved on Controls. |
| 3 Nov | A £1,280 credit note was raised at a branch counter with no manager's approval, above the £500 limit. | Flag | A genuine return of damaged paving slabs, approved afterwards. A £500 limit was set on the tills. |
| 10 Nov | Two invoices for the same delivery from a fixings supplier, both in the next payment run. | Flag | The second invoice was held and a credit note requested. |
| 16 Nov | The same login set up a new supplier and added it to the payment run, the job split the plan had due by 13 November. | Flag | The supplier was genuine. Supplier set-up moved to the credit controller, and Controls updated with that evidence. |
| 30 Nov | Monthly summary: five flags, each decided. After the owners updated Controls, High-risk frauds fell from 3 to 1 and the gaps on them from 6 to 1: staff training on phishing is still to do. | Note only | Phishing training booked for January, with the yearly briefing for everyone who makes payments. |
At the 30-day check-in on 18 November, Geoff and the managing director read the log together. They kept the limits on Inputs, and agreed the monthly summary should also go to the finance manager.
What the agent added. The method is unchanged: same spreadsheet, same controls, same scores. The agent looked for the warning signs every weekday, so the bank-detail change reached someone independent of the payment two days before the run, and the plan's fix-by dates were followed up as they passed. The flags describe transactions and controls; none of them suggested anyone was committing fraud. The figures above are fictional, and no £ figure is claimed for the agent.
Fictional and labelled: these events continue the worked example. The same six events are the sample rows in the Agent log of the worked-example spreadsheet. The agent is part of the guided and done-for-you routes; the self-implement kit does not include it.